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Chinese currency changes direction & depreciates

2008/12/04 in Tumblr blog imports

Its interesting how quickly trends can change.  Back in August of this year, I posted an article here on GloboTrends about the massive one-way bet investors were making on the appreciation of the Chinese currency.   Back then I wrote:

“Word of caution to investors:  If a shakeout ever does occur, and if foreign capital no longer sees China as a one-way bet on currency appreciation, there will likely be many local Chinese companies that will fail as they will see cheap and easy credit evaporate.  If you’re investing in China, be aware of the influence that this massive influx of foreign capital is having on Chinese banks, and their lending practices, and watch out for indicators that will surely come if the financial tides change…”

Back then, the chance of Chinese Renminbi depreciation seemed remote.  But earlier this week that momentum suddenly shifted direction, and the Chinese currency depreciated by nearly 1% in one day, the largest one-day drop in three years.

This wasnt the first time that a “sure-thing” bet on a currency movement turned out to be dramatically wrong.  A similar sudden reversal in currency direction occurred earlier this year with Vietnam, where international calls for allowing the currency to appreciate were suddenly replaced by fears of large scale depreciation.

But what is happening in China?  Is this the beginning of a new trend toward a weaker currency?  Is the move natural or state-induced?   Will this mark the beginning of protectionism?  Please join us in the forum for more discussion

A new fear enters the picture…

If in fact we are witnessing a change in Chinese currency direction, then that could have two effects.  One is internal to China where local manufacturers will be happy.

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Beggar thy neighbor – trade protectionism (part 1)

2008/12/04 in Tumblr blog imports

With slowing economies globally, there is the real threat that individual countries might choose to look out for their own economic growth by trying to boost exports.  If just one country does this, its ok.  But, if all countries all try to engineer lower exchange rates to boost exports, then we could be in for serious trouble.  This is a classic “prisoners dilemma” scenario.

Beggar-thy-neighbor trade policies (or competitive devaluations of currencies), is basically what turned the 1929 stock market crash into the 1930′s economic depression.  It wast until after trade protectionism became entrenched with “beggar thy neighbor” policies of the Smoot Hawley act in the US (in which the US raised import barriers on a wide variety of products) that sparked a global race to the bottom, eventually feeding the fire that led to Nazism and Fascism in Europe.

Example in Latin America

The real danger of the latest financial crisis is that it could lead countries to try and boost local production (and jobs) by engineering lower foreign exchange rates, and boosting exports.  Back in November, we saw the first real hint of raising protectionism when Mercosur (Latin American trade bloc) raised its common external tariff on a variety of items.

Example in China (maybe):

China represents the latest example of a nation trying to boost internal production (and jobs) by depreciating its currency against the US dollar.  The benefit to China is that a lower value of the currency benefits Chinese exports, making them cheaper on world markets.  This is good for China as it boosts demand for their products (if purchasing nations choose to substitute Chinese goods for others).

But the trouble with competitive devaluations of currencies is that in order for one country to benefit, another must loose.  This is the trouble with seeing the world as a Zero-Sum game (in which my gain is someone else’s  loss).

But during this crisis…if you assume that global demand is shrinking, then the only way for China to increase its exports would be to take away exports from someone else.

This must be true unless lower prices from China would be significant enough to spur additional demand from consumers than would otherwise exist.  This is possible, and welcome…but the more likely scenario is that consumer demand around the globe is going to contract in 2009, and that in order for China to boost its exports would be to take away share from someone else.

This is the essence of a “beggar thy neighbor” strategy.  Only time will tell if this is really happening, or if the sudden depreciation in the Chinese currency was organic and not state mandated.  Lets hope it was the former.  Keep tuned in to GloboTrends as we will track this trend (of rising protectionism)…

Video From Bloomberg

Focus on protectionism in China

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China’s role in (spreading) the global crisis to Latin America

2008/11/24 in Tumblr blog imports

What started as a financial crisis in the USA has turned into an economic crisis that effects the entire globe.  But, not all of the blame of contagion can be blamed on the USA.  In this article, I will outline how China also shares some of the blame for spreading the crisis to emerging markets (especially in Latin America).

First, let me admit my own previous mistake:  In a previous posting, I argued back in May ’08 that a slowdown in the US would mean less demand for Chinese products, which in turn would result in less demand for Latin American commodities, which would eventually hurt countries such as Brazil.  But, this isnt exactly the way it happened…

While it may be true that orders from China (for Latin American commodities) did fall as we expected them to…it is also true that the fall in orders had less to do with the crisis in the USA, and more to do with internal Chinese market demand (some of which was engineered to fall due to Chinese government policy).

But, investors around the globe punished Latin America anyways.  Without really understanding what was happening…investors assumed that falling commodity prices in Latin America was evidence of contagion from the US-based crisis.

You see…when orders from China started slowing, and commodity prices started falling, investors withdrew massive amounts of capital from Latin America.  Stock markets fell.  Currencies followed suit, and analysts around the globe recited the story that US financial crisis had finally spilled over to the “Latin America”…

But, while this analysis seems good on the surface, it may be lacking in substance.  What is missing from this analysis is the role that Chinese policy has played in engineering the Chinese slowdown.

According to Geoff Dyer of the Financial Times, “For all the talk of international crises, the slowdown (in China) actually started at home”.

Why did China slow?

Why is it important to talk about “what caused a Chinese slowdown”?  Well, because if you assume that the US slowdown was linked to the global economy through China, then its important to know whether the slowdown in China was a result of linkages with the US, or whether it was in fact caused by internal Chinese policy mistakes.

While the global crisis may have played a minor role, it appears as if Chinese slowdown is more a result of choice than of influence.

Earlier this year, China was facing a very difficult level of inflation as food and energy costs were putting intense pressure on domestic political stability.  In response to fears of an overheating economy, China put the breaks on the economy, and attempted to slow down bank lending, the construction industry, and to allow the currency to appreciate.  Just a few months ago, the biggest problem in China appeared to be a massive inflow of foreign currency and a resulting bubble in construction and investments.

With the Olympics quickly arriving, the Chinese temporarily asked companies to stop producing and polluting in and around Beijing.  In order to slow down the overheating economy, the Chinese put pressure on Banks to slow down lending.  In order to ease inflation pressures, the Chinese allowed their currency to appreciate rather drastically vs the Dollar (perhaps in response to US pressure?).

After the Olympics, construction slowed and spending on commodities followed.

Less commodities needed:

With the construction industry temporarily on hold, the financial industry lending less, and with exports challenged due to an appreciated currency, it appeared inevitable that China’s demand for commodities would slow.

Global investors get spooked

The trouble is that China was slowing just at the same moment that the financial crisis was hitting in the USA.  And, as a result, investors were looking very carefully to see if the crisis was going to spill over to other emerging nations.   While there was much talk of “decoupling“, many analysts were skeptical.  History had taught us that “when the US sneezed, Latin America caught a cold”.

Then, in early September we started hearing reports that the Chinese were cutting back purchases of commodities such as steel, and that Brazilian steel producers such as Vale were having trouble passing along price increases.   Commodity exporters around the globe started indicating falling demand from Chinese buyers, and as a result, commodity prices fell like a rock.  Investors had their proof that the world was in fact “coupled”, and that the financial crisis had inded spilled over to become a global economic crisis.  With proof of falling commodity prices on their trading screens, investors around the globe pulled money out of commodity exporting nations (such as Brazil), and currencies tumbled.   With falling currency prices, investors really got spooked as bets-gone-wrong caused massive losses at some of the most respected companies.

Mis-information and bad-assumptions

Investors that only see superficial analyst reports were probably misled to believe that falling commodity prices were a direct result of the financial crisis in the USA spilling over to the factories of China, and onto the mines of Latin America.  They likely mis-read the signs and assumed that falling commodity prices were a sign to start selling emerging markets for fear that slowing US consumer consumption was in fact causing a chain reaction of falling production in China, which was going to hurt global commodity-producing nations.

The reality is that a big cause of slowing Chinese demand for commodities was due to Chinese internal markets and regulatory decisions that had very little to do with the US financial crisis.

While the links between the US consumer and the Chinese producer may be real, they were not the main driver of global economic slowdown, and should not have been the trigger to ignite a global financial crisis.

Perhaps a better understanding of the Chinese economy and a more thorough understanding of the connections between China and the rest of the world could have helped investors to realize that falling commodity prices were not a direct result of the financial troubles on Wall Street, but were more of an indication of economic engineering in Beijing.   With cooler heads and a better understanding of these factors, perhaps we could have avoided the massive sell-off of emerging markets during September and October of 2008.

It is the purpose of GloboTrends to help highlight these global-linkages and to discuss their impacts on global economics and finance.  Please join us on our forum for more discussion…

Links from GloboTrends:

  1. Changes are happening in China
  2. China
  3. China and energy markets
  4. China internet industry
  5. China market entry strategy
  6. China trade data
  7. China’s stockmarket
  8. Doing business in China
  9. Private Equity in China
  10. Real estate market in China
  11. Rising importance of China
  12. Venture Capital in China

Further Reading:


Trends: Fiscal policy in, Monetary policy out

2008/11/11 in Tumblr blog imports

In a credit-crisis environment, the tools of monetary policy are rendered ineffective.  Fiscal policy is the only other choice (to stimulate the economy).

With central banks around the globe cutting rates, its clear that monetary policy alone will not be enough to steer our economies out of recession.

The reason that monetary policy has been so ineffective during this crisis, is that in order for monetary policy to work as an effective instrument of control, you first need the money markets to be working efficiently.   But, with the dysfunctional money markets not up to the task, the Central Banks around the globe are left with ineffective tools to influence the money supply, and hence control the markets.  For this reason, they are forced to look to fiscal stimulus to help.

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Stimulus package in China…

2008/11/10 in Tumblr blog imports

Over the weekend, it was widely reported that China proposed a “massive” fiscal stimulus package (of just over $580 billion US) to stimulate their internal market.

While many investors welcomed the news, it actually made me wonder about the effect that this action might have on the US dollar.  Let me explain…

For many recent years, China has maintained a current account surplus (by exporting more than they import), and have correspondingly maintained a capital account deficit (by investing massive amounts of capital overseas rather than at home).   As macroeconomic economists will tell you, the overall “balance of payments” must balance.  If you add up the current account + the capital account, it should = 0.   So, if you run a deficit in one account, you must run a surplus in the other (and vice-versa).

Take for example the US:  In the case of a country like the US, that means that if the US hopes to run huge current account deficits (as we have done for many years), the US needs to also run a capital account surplus (as we have done for many years).  This is the famous “borrowing from the Chinese to pay for Saudi Arabian oil (from recent campaign speeches).

From China’s perspective, the opposite is true…if they run a current account surplus (exporting way more then importing), then they MUST also have a capital account deficit (investing more money overseas than internally).  See supporting discussion here

Up until the recent credit crisis, this system seemed to work just fine.  But, now China is loosing their appetite for foreign investing, and has decided to start putting capital to work at home, rather than abroad.  While the $586 billion USD of this particular package  may not particularly worrisome in its scale, it does indicate a fundamental shift in Chinese intentions about where to allocate capital.

From the “balance of payments” perspective, what does it mean if China were to stop sending its capital abroad, but instead decided to ramp up spending at home?  For the US it might mean the beginning of the end of a long faithful buyer of US dollars.

From the Chinese perspective, it might mean that they should no longer be able to run such a large current account surplus.  Remember, if the capital account deficit were to diminish, then by the equilibrium of the balance of payments model, then so to should their current account surplus diminish as well.   But, how could this be achieved?  Obviously, the Chinese would not willingly decide to export less, but instead what should happen is that the Chinese currency should appreciate enough to significantly cut back on exports (until a new equilibrium can be established).   This makes sense;  if you think that the Chinese may cut back on purchasing US dollars (and selling Chinese Renmimbi), then the Chinese currency should appreciate.

While at the current moment, global finance may be preoccupied with the ongoing credit crisis, it may be masking this fundamental shift in underlying global support mechanisms for the dollar and the Yuan.  If that fundamental shift does occur, then watch out for the impact that this could have on global trade flows.

On the other hand…

If China wishes to keep powering its export sector, its in their interest to keep the currency valued low.  So, its very likely that they will continue purchasing US treasuries.  So long as China has a massive treasure chest full of foreign reserves, they are able to both fund internal growth and purchase US treasuries abroad (to power their currency lower).

Suggested Reading:



Country risk – How to measure?

2008/10/29 in Uncategorized

Which countries might be in trouble (risk of default of debts) as a result of the credit crisis?  How do you measure this?  What are the indicators?

There are a number of ways to measure the risk that a country might be in trouble…

  1. foreign currency debt rating :  Fitch ratings “investment grade?”…Companies such as Fitch, Moodys, and S&P all keep track of foreign countries sovereign debt, and rate the likelihood of default.
  2. Sovereign Credit Default Swaps :  insurance premiums purchased to insure against sovereign defaults.  By watching the premiums move up and down, you get a good indication of the market perception of the likelihood of default.  Higher cost for insurance = more chance of default.
  3. EMBI+ index:  The Emerging Markets Bond Index… tracks returns for actively traded external debt instruments (Sovereign Bonds) in emerging market, and is also J.P. Morgan’s most liquid U.S-dollar emerging markets debt benchmark
  4. The difference (spread) between emerging markets debts (Eurobonds issued outside the country) and US Treasuries.  See local bond markets and compare vs. US treasuries.
  5. Foreign reserves, if they are being spent by the country in order to adjust for a Reserve Balance of payments deficit is clearly not a good sign.  If it is happening that a country is paying out reserves to defend a currency, or make up for a loss of capital account, this might be a good indicator that the country is in trouble.
  6. Is the currency crashing in value?  If so, then its a great indicator that foreign exchange professionals are betting that the country might be in trouble, and so are betting against the currency (and locals are trying to get their money out).

Further Reading: