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Top macro-economic trends for 2012

2012/02/23 in Europe, Great Debate - Economics, macro trends, political economy, Rebalancing Global Finance

Underlying Trends that are Shaping our World Today 

Welcome to our ongoing discussion of global “macro” trends that we think are the most important to keep an eye on.  We are interested in global trends, how they happened, and in predicting their likely outcome… We like debates, and we are interested in Global Issues, so we welcome a variety of viewpoints.  Inclusion of material on this website definitely does NOT equal endorsement of ideas.

  • Trends we consider: political, economic, financial, social, international
  • Trends we do NOT consider: local trends, consumer trends, marketing trends, fashion trends (better to find another website for these :-)

Outside-the-box thinking welcome!   Some of these potential trends may seem statistically unlikely to occur in the short term (if at all), but if they were to happen, they could cause massive global disruption to the financial and economic systems, so they are worth discussing, and taking a closer look at.  In a world where the un-thinkable seems to happen with a greater frequency, it makes sense to start looking at the “worst case” scenario, and figure out how to (a) protect yourself, and (b) position your company / portfolio / career… to profit from ongoing trends.

Community involvement:  This document is dynamic, so any of our community is welcome to contribute, and to help shape our views of these important developments.  Please log in to our wiki, and feel free to comment…

 

2012 Trends

In no particular order, here are the global macro trends that we think will be most significant in the current year (2012):

Continue reading here: Visit our Wiki to see the rest of this article.

See also: Top Trends for 2009

 

Ireland, fiscal troubles, the IMF and the EU

2010/11/19 in Europe, political economy

Eurozone map in 2009 Category:Maps of the Eurozone
Image via Wikipedia

Euro membership, Inflation, Interest rates – effect on development, bubbles & bust

In recent weeks, we have seen Ireland thrust to the forefront of European fiscal crisis.  Why?  What has happened?  Here is the 5 minute overview of the problem…

A Brief History:

When Ireland joined the Eurozone, they gave up control over the interest rates.   During the ealy 2000′s, while inflation rates were relatively low across Europe (see chart below), the ECB was able to keep interest rates also relatively low.   This should be a good thing, but at the same time, a fast-growing economy like that of Ireland probably needed higher interest rates.   Slow growth in Germany meant that low interest rates were needed to spur growth, but booming growth in Ireland meant that higher interest rates were needed to slow it down.  The fundamental weakness (one of them) of the Eurozone is that “one-size-fits-all” interest rate policy of the ECB might not be appropriate for economies with different business cycles (one up while the other is down).   The trouble for a country like Ireland was that without higher rates, the economy was sure to overheat.    Another trouble was that Irish investors (especially Irish BANKS) could borrow money at cheap interest rates in continental Europe and invest at higher (expected) rates of return in Ireland (a “carry trade” or interest rate arbitrage).    Investors benefited with a fixed exchange rate, since there was no fear of currency devaluation and so the international borrowing seemed “risk free”.   Since money seemed easy, it flowed… and created asset  bubbles (especially in real estate).  All was good…. but, then came the housing bubble burst of 2007 and the fiscal deficit crisis of 2010….

Irish Fears:  Why Ireland doesn’t want a bailout from the EU / IMF:

The biggest fear that Ireland has is that by accepting a bailout from the EU / IMF, they would need to raise taxes.  The Irish are especially sensitive to threats that Ireland may need to raise corporate tax rates as a condition for accepting EU money.  This is sensitive stuff.   Ireland previously rejected the Lisbon Treaty because of fears that the EU would force them to raise corporate taxes (goal of the EU to harmonize tax rates across the union).   Back then, Ireland won a concession from the other members of the EU to specifically get an exemption, thus “guaranteeing” Ireland’s independent tax policy.    The agreement says that nothing in Lisbon treaty would result in “any change of any kind, for any member state, to the extent or operation of the competence of the EU in relation to taxation”.  Pretty clear stuff.  But the loophole is that if Ireland were to go begging to the EU for funds, they may be asked to “voluntarily” make adjustments to the tax structure in order to receive more funds.  This prospect has the Irish press nervous.

The Irish development model (Celtic Tiger): i.e. What Ireland doesn’t want to give up!

The cornerstone of Irish industrial policy has been = low corporate tax rates.  This is one of the fundamental reasons that many international companies have used Ireland as a headquarters for their European operations.   This started with US technology firms who looked to Ireland in the late 1980′s – early 1990′s.  Example:  Intel semiconductors arrived in 1989, with other multinationals following soon thereafter.

Ireland was attractive because:

  1. English speaking workforce
  2. Well educated
  3. Young population (compared to European competitors)
  4. Free trade zone with Europe – as barriers came down in 1992
  5. Grants from the state
  6. Low corporate income tax of 12.5%  (very low compared to the rest of the EU or the US — “Excluding exemptions, the average corporate tax rate in the EU is 23%; the U.S.’s corporate rate is 35%.1 )

The Irish fear now is that by accepting EU (or IMF) money, they will be “forced” to raise taxes (and not just focus on cutting costs).  Outsiders argue that something must be done to raise revenues for the budget to balance.  Irish counter that growth is needed and to raise corporate tax rates would be the equivalent of shooting themselves in the foot.   Irish argue that FDI, growth, jobs, exports… all of these factors are needed to grow out of this mess, and that low-corporate tax rates MUST remain in order for that to happen.    Only time will tell how this will play out…

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Is the “smart” money leaving China?

2009/01/14 in currency, macro trends, political economy

In recent news, Ive seen reports of big banks getting out of China…  They say its because they need the money to cover losses in the US/ Europe…which may seem plausible on the surface (and is perhaps a good enough reason to give the Chinese authorities), but, is something else going on here?

Are these banks pulling money out in anticipation of coming trouble in the Chinese banking sector?   This is what many analysts fear…perhaps the foreign banks themselves are betting that trouble is on the horizon in China, and are attempting to reverse their previous bets and get out.

Commercial banks behave internationally much like speculative portfolio capital does…moving into areas with growth potential, but then cutting losses and getting out at the first hint of trouble.  One thought is that these same western banks that have lost billions recently…don’t want to face investors (or, in the case of nationalized banks, tax-payers), and have to explain how their bailout money was wasted on speculation in China (if THAT bet were to go bad).

Another possibility is that foreign investors are fearful of currency depreciation (forced by the government to increase exporting competitiveness), and are so taking money off the table before its worth less.

Join our forum, and add your thoughts here:

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read more from FinancialPost.com:

“Royal Bank of Scotland has warned it may become the fourth big investor in just a few days to pull billions of dollars out of the Chinese banking system, fuelling fears that China’s faltering economy could be hit by massive capital outflows in coming months.

Reports indicate the British bank, now controlled by the U.K. government, has been in talks with Chinese regulators for the past few days to sell down its 4.3% stake in Bank of China worth $3.7-billion.

If RBS does pull out, it will follow sharply in the footsteps of Switzerland’s UBS, which last week sold its 1.3% stake in Bank of China for US$800-million, and Bank of America, which cut its holdings in China Construction Bank to 16.6% from more than 19% on Wednesday in a placement that raised US$2.8-billion.

Also, a foundation established by Hong Kong’s richest man, Li Ka-Shing, is widely reported to be selling two billlion shares in Bank of China in a transaction that will raise up to US$524-million.”

The moves by RBS and others to pull money out of the Chinese banking system reverse a globalization of the financial sector that had seen as much as US$25-billion in foreign funds poured into China’s banks in the past three years alone.”

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If China were to stumble…

2009/01/11 in macro trends, political economy

Most analysts predict that China will continue to grow at a rate (more than) 7% in 2009.  This follows decades of double digit growth, capping an amazing run in economic development.  But, while most analysts discuss 7% as the critical growth level to support the massive demand for jobs from an ever-increasing population, it is rarely discussed what would happen if China were to dip much lower than that, and if it actually faced a recession.

What would happen to the global economy if China were to stumble?  Imagine growth falling to just 3-4%, or even negative growth for a year or two…would social unrest hit critical levels?  Could China deflate its currency enough to drive enough exports to put them back on track?  Would that spark a global trade war?  What would happen to global commodity prices, and what would be the effect on Latin America/ Africa?

see our wiki discussion “changes are happening in China

While I may agree with most analysts that forecast 7-10% GDP growth for 2009, I do have to wonder if its possible for China to ALWAYS have this kind of growth.  Economic history  seems to dictate that ALL economies eventually face recession (not just sub-seven percent growth, but true recessions).  China should be no different, in that they should also eventually face recession.

One of the least discussed topics (as far as I know) is “what would happen to the global economy if China were to face a real recession?”.   Would they continue buying up US treasuries (and continue financing the US recovery)?  If not, would the dollar tumble?  Would global supply chains be effected, and if so, how?

The possibility of a Chinese recession should be discussed, and should be planned for.  Because if you look seriously at China, you will see that the country’s economy is more fragile and delicately balanced that it may appear at first sight…its based on a series of controls…all of which have to be in place to make the system work.  Any of which, if they were to fail, could cause the system to break down…

Currency Controls

The growth model that China has pursued has been one of export-oriented growth, and managed currency exchange rates.  The currency is managed vs. the US dollar (as are many Asian and oil-exporting countries currencies).  This means that they actively buy up US treasuries (buying dollars and selling local currency) to drive down their local currency.  This means that the money they receive from exports is recycled back to the US, and not allowed to stay in China.   Investments in China are largely driven by FDI (foreign direct investments).

This relationship between the US and China is fundamental to explain the growth story behind China’s development over the past decades.  China is the bank, the USA is the borrower.  China is the producer, the USA is the consumer.  Think of the relationship like “vendor financing” from the producer to the consumer.  They finance, and we purchase.

But what would happen if China were forced to appreciate their currency?  Would internal local demand pick up enough to offset the decrease in foreign demand?   In 2007 we saw what looked like a substantial movement upward (appreciation) of the Chinese currency vs. the US dollar.  This was allowed by the Chinese in an effort to combat local inflation (and perhaps in response to political pressure).  But as the economy started to slow, and as massive amounts of people were laid off with factory closings, the Chinese quickly shifted course are depreciated in December of 2008.  Local pressure of social unrest is much more powerful than foreign pressure of trade retaliation.  Plus, it helped that local inflation pressure eased, thus removing local unrest over rising food prices.

Capital controls:

In order to both control the currency AND also have local monetary policy control, the Chinese must also have in place strict capital controls which limit the flow of money into and out of China.   The result (or intention) of this policy is that local Chinese are not able to invest their savings overseas.    For foreign investors, it was an attempt to limit the flow of “hot money” into China, which was necessary if you are going to try and keep the value of the currency down, and avoid a rash of inflation.

One fear is that if the capital controls were to break down, that could spell the end of the currency controls.  It would also spell the end to the savings controls which I will discuss next…

Savings Controls:

In recent years in China, all savings were basically funneled to the state, who in turn invests that money overseas for them (buying up US treasuries, etc).  The machine that drives the finance model in China rests on the fact that local Chinese had very few options with which to save for their future.  The only real investment for the future was to give your saving to a government- owned bank which paid tiny returns (like 1-2%).  While in recent years there has been some challenges made to this fundamental system (which are good for local Chinese), these changes are a risk to the Chinese model because if local citizens had more options, then the borrowing cost for the government would surely rise (making money more expensive for the Chinese government).   The system worked because local Chinese had no choice but to give their money to the government at very low interest rates.  In recent years we saw massive bubbles in alternative assets as locals sought other ways to save for the future at higher rates of returns.  The stock market (which saw a huge bubble), or in real estate (which also saw a huge bubble).

With the WTO came foreign banks, and with foreign banks comes savings options.  But savings options threaten the low cost borrowing scheme of the Chinese model.  If there were also to be foreign investment options for Chinese, it could see the end to capital controls / currency controls.  All of this must go together in order for it to work…

Mobility Controls:

The engine for economic growth in China has been located along the eastern shoreline.   Cities like Shanghai and factories along the coast, however, have been built with labor from the interior of China.  These migrant workers were the source of much of China’s cost advantage (along with the managed currency).  But, interestingly, these workers are not considered full time residents of these locations, and must be sent back to the country side if the economy were to slow down.  They are essentially citizens without rights in the places where they live.  Without the rights to find their own apartments, or to seek other jobs (with higher pay) , these workers are forced to accept the pay that comes from the company that sponsors them.   This kind of migration control is very critical to economic magic that has powered China’s growth.  But, what happens if China goes into recession and massive amounts of people are “ordered” to return back to the country side, and to leave the cities?  Will they all obey?  Will there be social unrest from urbanized residents that dont want to return?

Bank Fragility

In the US, we have been learning the hard way that banks are fragile by their very nature (borrowing short, and lending long is inherently risky).  This is true not only in the US, but the world over, and is especially true in emerging markets where there is less faith in regulatory institutions. Layered on top of this inherent banking fragility is the fact that China’s banks have been flush with cash for so long that they have surely built up portfolios of bad loans.  Political pressure has surely played a part, and has added to the fear that China’s regional banks are fragile in spite of a massive foreign-reserve balance on the national level.

Delicate balance…

The risk with China is that they need ALL of these controls to stay in place.  If one or more of them were to fall, the entire system may be put at risk.

As long as the economy continues to grow at double digit rates, then it could be possible for China to keep all of these controls in place for many years to come.  But, it is possible that someday the economy will to fall into recession (not just below 7% growth, but a true recession).  If that day does come, then more discussion is needed to look at how China might change as a result.  Will any /all of these controls crumble?  If so, then how would that effect the US?  Would China still want to purchase US treasuries?  Would US interest rates shoot upward?  How would global supply chains be reconfigured?  Would countries like Brazil become more competitive in manufacturing?   Who would take China’s place as the next manufacturing powerhouse?

As of yet, the Chinese have not slowed their purchases of US assets, in spite of what you may have read in the New York Times (here).

(yes, I admit that looking at this scenario is a bit like looking at a “black swan” / “fat-tail” probability in statistics…but so was the global credit crisis)…

….

On a personal level, I think China is one the most complex, and interesting cases …and is surely a long-term growth story (as Jim Rogers said, it would be like investing in New York in 1900…if you invest for the long run, its surely one of the best investments out there).

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Challenges in Greece…

2008/12/15 in political economy

International IQ Update – Country in the News: GREECE

The violent riots in Greece have erupted as a result of an atmosphere of high unemployment, frustration and hopelessness, especially among the youth. The very same symptoms are present in Spain, France, Italy and elsewhere in Europe. With the worsening global economic crisis and the resulting rise in unemployment, the likelihood of “contagion” of violent street protests throughout Europe is actually quite high.

Recent developments:

Daily violent street riots in Athens and other cities since the December 6 killing of a teenager by police

On the night of December 6, in the Athens neighborhood of Exarchia, known as a center of anti-establishment and anarchist activities, two policemen on patrol were taunted and insulted by a group of teenagers. In the confrontation that ensued, a 15-year old was shot dead by police.

Public reaction:

There has been a very angry and violent reaction on a daily basis all over the country. Peaceful street demonstrations deteriorate into violent riots, with firebomb attacks on cars, shops, banks and police stations, causing substantial property damage without any significant intervention by police.

Questions:

Why so much anger? Why violence? Why are the police so passive? What are the political and economic implications?

Analysis:

  • Greek society is still strongly affected by memories of the police and army brutality of the military junta that governed from 1967 to 1974, and violently crushed a student uprising on November 17, 1973 (in the Exarchia neighborhood).
  • The current Prime Minister, Kostas Karamanlis, of the center-right New Democracy party, was elected in March 2004, 5 months before the Athens Olympic Games.
  • The successful and well-organized Olympics restored a sense of pride and optimism. The return to power of the New Democracy party, after two decades of dominance by the social-democratic PASOK party, raised expectations of improved economic conditions and implementation of needed structural reforms (in the education system, the pension system, etc.)
  • Karamanlis managed to narrowly win re-election in 2007, but all-in-all the results of his administration have been very disappointing. The economy has stagnated and unemployment has increased especially among the youth. The country has been plagued by several serious corruption scandals involving land swaps and pension funds. The administration is widely accused of having mismanaged the handling of the out of control forest fires in the summer of 2007. The promised reforms never materialized.
  • The police shooting on December 6 was the detonator of the widespread malaise and discontent.
  • The majority of the population, however, does not support violence. The violent turn of the street demonstrations are due to small groups of well-organized anti-establishment anarchists, bent on creating chaos by attacking the symbols of “the corporate machine”.
  • The police have been disconcertingly passive by staying on the sidelines and allowing the violent rampages to proceed unimpeded. This is due to a deliberate government policy of maintaining a low police profile in an attempt to avoid further mayhem.
  • However, this approach appears to have backfired. Adding to the economic insecurity and the mistrust of corrupt politicians, now many people feel unsafe and physically insecure and don’t trust that the police will protect them.
  • The political implications may be quite serious for the Karamanlis administration. Its popularity is plummeting and the odds are increasing of a return to power of the opposition PASOK party.
  • The economic outlook is quite bleak. The turmoil is happening in the middle of a severe world-wide economic contraction. The reputation of Greece as a quiet, safe and friendly destination has been tainted with possible short-term impacts on tourism and foreign direct investment.
  • The atmosphere of frustration and hopelessness that prevails in some segments of Greek society, especially the youth, is also present in several other European countries, such as Spain, France and Italy. There has already been some evidence of “contagion” with several small but violent protests taking place across Europe. With the worsening of the economic crisis and the anticipated increase in unemployment, it is possible that this worrisome trend might intensify.

Dr. Hugo Hervitz is Executive Director of Forum-Nexus Study Abroad (www.forum-nexus.com) and of the Forum-Nexus International IQ Institute. He has been a Professor of Economics and International Business in South Florida for over 25 years, specializing in Europe and Latin America. He currently teaches Economics at Nova Southeastern University and Cross Cultural Communication in Thunderbird’s Global MBA Program in Miami.